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This	 article	 offers	 a	 new	 mechanism	 of	 law	 enforcement,	 combining	
sanctions	and	rewards	into	a	scheme	of	“reversible	rewards.”	A	law	enforcer	
sets	 up	 a	 pre‐committed	 fund	 and	 offers	 it	 as	 reward	 to	 another	 party	 to	




otherwise	be	 too	costly	 to	deter.	 It	argues	 that	reversible	rewards	could	be	
used	to	bolster	enforcement	in	selective	areas	of	private	and	public	law,	and	
could	also	be	applied	strategically	in	litigation.	 	



















































































































































































































































































































been	 identified	 as	 commitment	 devices.	 Reversible	 rewards	 are	 not	 a	 new	 commitment	






device,	 but	 rather	 a	method	 to	 take	advantage	of	pre‐commitment	 strategies.9	 	Thus,	 the	






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                 
16	 In	 the	Copenhagen	Conference	 in	2009,	China	 requested	 that	developed	 countries	 commit	one	
percent	of	 their	GDP—amounting	to	over	$300	billion	annually—to	a	 fund	that	would	help	China	
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